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Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Geopolitical Weekly: China Tests Japanese and U.S. Patience, February 26, 2013

By Rodger Baker
Vice President of East Asia Analysis

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has warned Beijing that Tokyo is losing patience with China's assertive maritime behavior in the East and South China seas, suggesting China consider the economic and military consequences of its actions. His warning followed similar statements from Washington that its patience with China is wearing thin, in this case over continued Chinese cyberespionage and the likelihood that Beijing is developing and testing cybersabotage and cyberwarfare capabilities. Together, the warnings are meant to signal to China that the thus-far relatively passive response to China's military actions may be nearing an end.

In an interview The Washington Post published just prior to Abe's meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington, Abe said China's actions around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and its overall increasing military assertiveness have already resulted in a major increase in funding for the Japan Self-Defense Forces and coast guard. He also reiterated the centrality of the Japan-U.S. alliance for Asian security and warned that China could lose Japanese and other foreign investment if it continued to use "coercion or intimidation" toward its neighbors along the East and South China seas.

Abe's interview came amid warnings on Chinese cyberactivity from Washington. Though not mentioning China by name in his 2013 State of the Union address, Obama said, "We know foreign countries and companies swipe our corporate secrets. Now our enemies are also seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, our air traffic control systems." Obama's comments, and the subsequent release of a new strategy on mitigating cybertheft of trade secrets, coincided with a series of reports highlighting China's People's Liberation Army backing for hacking activities in the United States, including a report by Mandiant that traced the activities to a specific People's Liberation Army unit and facility. The timing of the private sector reports and Obama's announcement were not coincidental.

Although Washington has taken a slightly more restrained stance on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, reportedly urging Tokyo not to release proof that a Chinese ship locked its fire-control radar on a Japanese naval vessel, clearly Washington and Tokyo hold the common view that China's actions are nearing the limits of tolerance. Given its proximity to China, Japan is focusing on Chinese maritime activity, which has accelerated in the past two to three years around the disputed islands, in the South China Sea and in the Western Pacific east of Japan. The United States in turn is highlighting cyberespionage and the potential for cyberwarfare. Both are drawing attention to well-known Chinese behavior and warning that it is nearing a point where it can no longer be tolerated. The message is clear: China can alter its behavior or begin to face the consequences from the United States and Japan.


Abe drew a sharp response from Beijing, though less from his interview than from another Washington Post article based on the interview that interpreted Abe as saying, "China has a 'deeply ingrained' need to spar with Japan and other Asian neighbors over territory, because the ruling Communist Party uses the disputes to maintain strong domestic support." Tokyo responded to China's complaints by saying the second Post article was misleading but that the transcript of Abe's interview was accurate.

Although the Japanese government did not elaborate on this point, by "ingrained" Abe did not mean Chinese behavior per se, but rather the anti-Japanese undercurrents of China's education system and the use of anti-Japanese sentiment as the basis of Chinese patriotism. 
In addition to being Beijing's standard knee-jerk reaction to any less-than-flattering comments by a foreign leader, the Chinese government and media response represented an attempt to shift attention from Chinese actions toward the "hawkish" Abe as the source of rising tensions in East Asia. A follow-up Xinhua article published after the Abe-Obama meeting cautioned the United States to be "vigilant against the rightist tendency in Tokyo" and said the first- and second-largest economies, the United States and China, should work together "to safeguard the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and contribute to global development." Other Chinese media reports suggested that Abe failed to gain support from Obama during the visit for his Senkaku/Diaoyu policies or for a unified stance against China. The undertones of China's response, however, reflect less confidence.



The Economic Threat

What Abe said in his interview apart from the Chinese media spin is instructive. According to Abe, relations between China and Japan have been suffering due to unintended consequences of moves by the Communist Party of China to retain its legitimacy. China's economic opening led to unequal prosperity, eliminating the Party's main pillar of support, equality. To counter that, the Chinese government pursued a two-prong strategy of economic growth and patriotism. Economic growth required Beijing to expand its sourcing of commodities, moving China naturally onto the sea. Meanwhile, patriotism, tinged with anti-Japanese teaching, has come to pervade the educational system and society.



Abe argued that China is pursuing a path of coercion or intimidation, particularly in the East and South China seas, as part of its resource-acquisition strategy. Anti-Japanese undercurrents in Chinese society due to the inculcation of patriotism have won domestic support for the assertive Chinese actions. But this has strained Japanese-Chinese economic relations, thus undercutting China's own rapid economic growth. And without continued economic growth, Abe cautioned, China's single-party leadership would be unable to control its population of 1.3 billion.

Within this context, Abe cautioned that it is important to make Beijing realize it cannot take another country's territory or territorial water or change the rules of international engagement. He raised the defense budget and emphasized that the Japanese-U.S. alliance is critical for regional security, as is a continued U.S. presence in the region. He also warned that China's assertive behavior would have economic consequences and that although Japanese companies profit in China, they are responsible for 10 million Chinese jobs. If the risk of doing business in China rises, then "Japanese investments will start to drop sharply," he added.

Abe's warnings were designed to strike at the core Chinese government fears of economic and social instability and military encroachment by the United States and a reinvigorated Japan. On the economic front, Japan is one of the top sources of actual foreign direct investment in China and a major trading partner. Although it is difficult to verify Abe's claims of 10 million Chinese employed due to Japanese investments, the implications of Chinese actions on bilateral economic cooperation are more easily observable. In 2012, a year when tensions ran high due to Japan's decision regarding what it called the "purchase" of some of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from a private Japanese citizen, anti-Japanese protests flared in China, as did unofficial boycotts of Japanese goods. Total trade between China and Japan fell 3.9 percent year on year, the first drop since the major financial crisis of 2009, with exports falling more than 10 percent. Japanese foreign direct investment, although rising slightly for the year, saw a major falloff in the summer when tensions between the two countries ran high.

Other factors played a role in the decline of trade and investment, including reduced overall Japanese demand and shifts in suppliers for certain key resources (and adjustments in Japan's export markets). And Japan itself would suffer from a major break in trade relations, though Tokyo may be taking steps to cushion against fallout from economic disputes with China. Japanese firms in fact already are beginning to show an interest is shifting some of their manufacturing bases out of China even without the added incentive of anti-Japanese sentiment-driven protests and boycotts. In 2012, the gap between China and the United States as the top destination for Japanese exports narrowed further to just 0.6 percent. Abe also hinted strongly that Japan has finally decided to pursue talks with the United States over the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trading bloc (unofficially) designed to exclude China.

Although Japanese companies are unlikely to flee China en masse, the threat of a slow reorientation toward stronger trade ties with the United States and softening investment in China strikes at one of the Communist Party's major concerns, namely maintaining social stability through employment. Like that of Japan, exports and growth have driven China's economy. This does not necessarily mean profits or efficiency; on the contrary, Beijing has harnessed the constant growth to maintain employment and provide loans to keep businesses operating, even when they operate with razor-thin profit margins or at a loss.

Employment represents China's preferred tool to maintain social stability, and the Party sees stability as paramount to retaining its legitimacy as the unchallengeable and unopposable leader of China. Both the Chinese government and Abe know this, and now Abe is threatening to target Chinese growth, upending the whole system of stability. The Japanese may not really be able to effect or afford any drastic change in economic relations with China, but with the activation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and with a possible Japanese government emphasis on investment to Southeast Asia and Africa (with private investment likely to follow), the economic pressure on China could slowly build.

The Military Warning

The military warning is therefore more immediately troubling to Beijing. Both Tokyo and Washington are reaching their limits for tolerating aggressive Chinese behavior. The United States is pivoting toward Asia, seen by China as a constraining action. Japan is strengthening ties with Russia, Australia, India and Southeast Asia, something China regards as containment. China's emergence as a big power has not been entirely smooth. Any time a nation seeks to alter the status quo between other powers, disruption and resistance are inevitable. China's maritime expansion and its cyberespionage and emerging cyberwar capabilities are closely linked to its economic and social policies. The former is a more obvious concrete action, but one that raises the risk of creating the appearance of being ready for peer competition long before China actually is. The latter at least offers some opportunities for plausible deniability (though Washington is now removing that already-translucent veil), and reflects an attempt to exploit an area where China's overall vulnerabilities are less of a liability; it is the weak taking its best available action against the strong.

For Japan, maritime activity around the disputed islands is manageable so long as it remains in the civilian realm, but the use of fire control radar on Japanese ships and overflights by Chinese aircraft are unacceptable. (Japanese aircraft are shadowing Chinese overflights. In a recently reported case, a Chinese Y-8 surveillance aircraft and the Japanese F-15 interceptor came within 5 meters, or 16 feet, of one another, creating the potential for a collision like the one between a U.S. and Chinese aircraft in 2001.) And while the United States may have tolerated the occasional case of cybertheft and cyberespionage, as Obama noted, such activities become unacceptable in scale and when it shifts to targeting U.S. infrastructure, where it has the potential to disrupt electricity grids, communications systems and other industrial processes.

Japan and the United States have both called their defense alliance the cornerstone of their regional policies and relations. Japan continues to evolve its interpretation of its constitutional limit on military activity, and Tokyo has pledged to Washington to take a greater role in ensuring regional security. The escalation of Chinese naval activity has given the impression of a confident and capable Beijing on its way to changing the balance of naval power in the region. China has built the impression of a strong modern navy backed by land-based missiles, with modern ships and technology and an emerging international reach. China's anti-access area denial strategy is an increasing point of contention in Japan and the United States, where there are warnings that the Chinese navy will soon outpace the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, limiting U.S. naval capabilities with its "carrier-killer" missiles and quantitatively superior fleet.



The Chinese navy has undergone a significant modernization program over the past decade. Still, it is far from ready to compete head to head with the Japanese navy, much less with Japan's treaty ally, the United States. Modernization efforts and the fleet-building program have yet to make for a superb Chinese navy, nor would having superb sailors. A superb navy requires organization, doctrine, principles and most of all experience. The main problem constraining China's navy is not its shipbuilding or recruitment, but its limited ability to truly integrate its forces for war fighting and fleet operations. This requires substantial knowledge and training in logistics, cooperative air defense and myriad other complex factors.

There really is only one real measurement for a navy: Its ability to win against its likely rival. Part of determining the quality of a navy depends upon its technology and part on doctrine, but a substantial part is actual experience. China's navy has little war-fighting experience, even in the past. This has substantially limited the number of individuals within the officer corps knowledgeable or capable of effective operations in the highly complex world of modern military engagements. The Chinese navy may have new technology and be building toward numerical superiority, but it faces off against a U.S. Navy with centuries of experience and generations of admirals schooled in combat. Even the Japanese navy has more than a century of experience and a tradition of maritime warfare. The lack of combat experience significantly limits China's naval capability.

The Chinese government officially downplays these capabilities and any talk of a potentially aggressive nature of the Chinese military. But Beijing does little to dissuade such speculation, allowing a steady stream of images and commentaries in the Chinese popular media and the strategic leaking of imagery in China's social media. Beijing likes to appear fierce while saying it is not. But the problem with this strategy is exactly what Abe has pointed out: In appearing threatening, concrete steps are taken to counter China's maritime expansion. Abe is calling China's bluff, exhorting Beijing to reassess the correlation of forces in the region before continuing its aggressive pattern.

China Tests Japanese and U.S. Patience is republished with permission of Stratfor.

Sunday, February 24, 2013

It's at times like this I really ask "Why did I go to college?"

Here I sit with the partner I'm training at Ben Taub General Hospital Emergency Room. We've been sitting here for almost five hours waiting for a doctor to say "He's on PCP but he's stable, I'll sign the release form" so we can book him.

We met J at a fast food restaurant where he drove up to the order machine of the drive through and then just stopped. After a few minutes the clerk had enough and said "Please order or move to let the others pass through..." In simple language, he told the lady "F^&* em!...." So we get called after he gets out of the car threatening the security officer of the place. And he's got a suspended license for previous DWIs so by law we need to draw blood at the hospital. After actually get the vampire to take his blood the MD said he needs to get blood work on him. And we sit while he starts to spit out and try and pull away from his handcuffs.

As we're dealing with J another patient in the ER (also on something synthetic) gets off his bed, screaming "Let me out of here!...." and pulling his IVs our. After some initial work to get his to calm down he goes nuts and it takes 8 of us to get him secured to the bed. As I'm trying to get a handcuff on him the end of one cuff pries against my finger and I have a nice little red spot where the blood is. Get him outside the ER and the nurse gives him the cocktail and he slowly starts to calm down. Good stuff. I asked the nice nurse "Can I get some of that stuff....sleeping after a 14 hours shift is sometimes strangely difficult." And another nice nurse gives me an ice pack for the bobo. And we get him back in the emergency room for another few hours of rest before he's sent on to the psych ward. And my finger hurts! WAAAAAAAA!

This is the only call we've had all shift. Dropped as we got on duty and I figured this sounded like an excellent field training call and in spite of my complainants, it is. Welcome to the job, this is it.

So my partner and I spent the following hours waiting for blood work to come by so some resident spending his time in hell can sign a few papers and the question comes up again. Why did I go to college for this?

I joke about this knowing most new cops have at least some college (60 hours is pretty much the minimum) while many have more than that. I'm working on a master's as I type. Again I ask, why did I go to college?

Because for me, like most people, their college degree is not related to what they really do. I won't trade the experience of college for anything, the people I met, friends I've kept since then. And more to the point the question is why do I do this? Because, like many other endeavors, this is more than a job. It's a calling. Like the nurses around me working at warp speed on Saturday night while their friends are at home or out on the town. Or the firemen out there who I think are certifiable. Great philosophical discussion with cops and firemen, who is more insane? I've always pointed out "Hey pal, if I got a bad guy inside I can always wait for backup...you got to go inside the burning building!" (which they do and bring em out alive!). But again, this is my calling and the calling of many (I won't say all....I've worn a badge too long to believe that) and this is what a society requires. Cops, firemen, medics, nurses, soldiers. Men and women who do the dirty work that's needed.

So again, I look over the masses of people in the emergency room (J is still acting a fool...then again he ain't acting) and the guy on synthetic is enjoying his cocktail and my partner and I wonder when we get off.

It's a bit more than a job. Thanks to all who wear to the badge and run to rescue those trapped.

To everyone else, sleep tight. We got the watch!

Friday, February 22, 2013

I like this! Business telling the G-Man where he can go

A push back to the idiots who scream "You don't need ten rounds to kill a deer!"
Firearms Companies Restricting Sales To GOVERNMENT Agencies In Areas That Restrict Gun Rights

A growing number of firearm and firearm-related companies have stated they will no longer sell items to states, counties, cities and municipalities that restrict their citizens' rights to own them.

According to The Police Loophole, 34 companies have joined in publicly stating that governments who seek to restrict 2nd Amendment rights will themselves be restricted from purchasing the items they seek to limit or ban.

Extreme Firepower Inc., located in Inwood, WV has had a longstanding policy that states:

"The Federal Government and several states have enacted gun control laws that restrict the public from owning and possessing certain types of firearms...If a product that we manufacture is not legal for a private citizen to own in a jurisdiction, we will not sell that product to a law-enforcement agency in that jurisdiction."

York Arms, located in Buxton, ME released a statement following new legislation in New York:

"Based on the recent legislation in New York, we are prohibited from selling rifles and receivers to residents of New York. We have chosen to extend that prohibition to all governmental agencies associated with or located within New York."

Quality Arms, located in Rigby, ID writes on their website, "elected officials have their own agenda to circumnavigate the truth and destroy the constitution of the United States."

The site states: "Quality Arms Idaho will not supply and firearm or product, manufactured by us, or any other company nor will we warranty, repair, alter, or modify and firearm owned by any State, County or Municipality who infringes on the right of its citizens to bear arms under the 2nd Amendment."

Bravo Company USA states:

"The people at Bravo Company USA and BCM support responsible private individuals having access to the same tools of civilian Law Enforcement to affect the same ends...As such Bravo Company's policy is that law enforcement officials and departments will be restricted to the same type of products available to responsible private individuals of that same city or state."...

I reviewed the list and the only major company I saw was Barrett Arms and let's be honest, not too many local or state agencies buy .50 rifles. But the feds do. And who knows, Beth, can I get this when I make Lieutenant....hey, a man can dream!

Again, the major manufacturers (Sig, Glock, Smith and Wesson, etc) ain't here. Yet. But if companies starting to refuse to sell or support their weapons (Sorry NYPD, Glock will not sell you spare 15 round magazines, it's against the law remember) that may slap some of these idiots in Albany in the face.

Thursday, February 21, 2013

Security Weekly: The Rise of a New Nigerian Militant Group, February 21, 2013

By Matthew Bey and Sim Tack

In the past week, 14 foreigners have been kidnapped in northern Nigeria and Cameroon in two separate attacks. No group has claimed responsibility for the second attack, which occurred Feb. 19 in Cameroon, but the location is adjacent to Boko Haram's core territory in northeast Nigeria. Ansaru, a splinter group of Boko Haram, claimed responsibility for the first attack and could be responsible for the second since, unlike Boko Haram, it has a history of kidnapping foreign nationals. If Boko Haram conducted the second attack, it would signal a significant shift in the group's targets and tactics.

As Stratfor noted, Boko Haram's capabilities in 2012 were limited to soft targets near the group's base of operations in northeastern Nigeria. Ansaru has emerged over the past year and appears to have surpassed Boko Haram in its range of tactics and targets. Ansaru has relied on armed attacks for kidnappings rather than suicide bombings. Ansaru's targets have included foreigners and those involved with the intervention in Mali, while Boko Haram's targets have been Nigerian.

Nearly all of the Ansaru attacks since December 2012, as well as the unclaimed kidnapping in Cameroon, have targeted French nationals or those supporting French operations in Mali. This has raised the fear that widespread kidnappings will be fallout from the Mali intervention. A continuation of this violence could harm foreign interests in Nigeria and the surrounding countries and strengthen militant jihadism throughout the region.

Ansaru's Origins and Connections

Not a lot is known about the origin of Ansaru, but following Boko Haram's attacks on Kano -- a predominately Muslim city in Nigeria -- that killed almost 200 people in January 2012, Ansaru publicly split from Boko Haram, denouncing the killings of innocent Muslims. However, the group's formation began earlier in connection to two kidnappings.

The first was in May 2011, when a group claiming to be al Qaeda in the Land Beyond the Sahel and a faction of Boko Haram kidnapped two engineers -- one British and one Italian -- in Birnin Kebbi, Nigeria. On Dec. 1, 2011, a video was sent to Agence Nouakchott d'Information, Mauritania's state media outlet, demanding a 5 million-euro (about $6.7 million) ransom. Demanding millions in ransoms is a strategy employed by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; Nigerian militants' demands do not typically reach this level. Agence Nouakchott d'Information is known to have close contacts with al Qaeda's North African branch and served as the mouthpiece for Mokhtar Belmokhtar during the January 2013 attack on the Ain Amenas plant in Algeria. The mediator in the ransom negotiations, Mustafa Ould Limam Chafi, also negotiated many of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's previous hostage ransoms, including the release of U.N. Special Envoy to Niger Robert Fowler, the Canadian diplomat who was kidnapped in Niger in 2008. The connections to Agence Nouakchott d'Information and Chafi suggest that the group responsible for the May 2011 kidnappings in Nigeria -- Ansaru or its predecessor faction within Boko Haram -- has close ties with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

The man behind the May 2011 operation was trained by Khalid al-Barnawi, whom the U.S. State Department designated a global terrorist in June 2012 because of his ties to Boko Haram and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Al-Barnawi's connection with North African jihadist groups includes time spent with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, where he worked with Belmokhtar. He also set up kidnapping training camps in Algeria. It is unclear what the link is between al-Barnawi and Ansaru. Some experts have told news media that Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, who claims to be Ansaru's leader, could be a pseudonym for al-Barnawi. Al-Ansari surfaced earlier as Boko Haram's commander in Nigeria's northeastern states, which has been Ansaru's primary area of operation.

The second kidnapping was the January 2012 abduction of a German engineer in Kano. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claimed responsibility in a video sent to Agence Nouakchott d'Information, but it is more likely that a local group kidnapped the engineer. The hostage was killed during a rescue attempt by German special operations forces in Kano; al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb typically transports hostages to the mountains of northern Mali. According to a Stratfor source, just two weeks after the rescue attempt, the same German special operations forces group targeted a convoy of four cars in northern Nigeria, possibly to disrupt a rumored meeting between a representative of al Shabaab and Abu Zeid, a prominent al Qaeda commander in the Sahel. It is likely that the German special operations forces obtained relevant intelligence in the rescue attempt and acted on it. If such a piece of intelligence was found in Kano, then links between the group behind the operation and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb must be fairly robust, which would mean that al-Barnawi was almost certainly involved with the operation.

Since the death of Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, internal tensions have risen between nationalist factions aligned with present Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau and transnational factions. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has long sought a connection with Boko Haram, and it appears that the group has established ties with Ansaru and that the tensions between national and transnational factions of Boko Haram led to the split.

Targets and Tactics


Ansaru's first claimed attack was in November 2012, when 40 gunmen assailed the Special Anti-Robbery Squad detention facility in Abuja. After claiming responsibility, al-Ansari stated that Ansaru would target foreigners. The next attack was by 30 gunmen on a French company's compound in Katsina, Nigeria, resulting in the kidnapping of a French engineer. Afterwards, al-Ansari said the attack was because of France's support for an intervention in Mali. This was also the first attack against a Western target in the region since the August 2011 Abuja U.N. bombing, which remains Boko Haram's only transnational attack.
In January, Ansaru ambushed a military convoy bound for Mali -- its second consecutive attack with a transnational objective. Ansaru followed this with an abduction of seven foreign nationals in Bauchi, Nigeria, on Feb. 16. While kidnappings of foreigners are rare in northern Nigeria and Boko Haram has never claimed responsibility for one, Ansaru appears to be focusing on kidnapping operations similar to those carried out by al Qaeda's North African branch.

Boko Haram's tactics can be broken down generally into two categories: suicide bombings (typically using vehicle-borne explosives) and motorcycle ambushes. Boko Haram's target set typically constitutes churches, the police, the military, religious leaders and political institutions. Since November 2012, Boko Haram has attacked a church in a military compound in Kaduna state, made an assassination attempt on the emir of Kano and bombed two churches on Christmas Eve. In December 2012, vehicle-borne suicide bombers targeted offices of two international phone service providers, but this was because the companies were assisting authorities, not because Boko Haram was making a move toward international targets.

Ansaru's attacks, on the other hand, have consisted of raids by gunmen against hardened targets. A platoon-sized element typically assaults the compound where hostages will be abducted, or prisoners freed, before withdrawing. Explosives have not been used in Ansaru raids, except to breach barriers. Such attacks require different capabilities and preparations than Boko Haram's suicide bombings do.

It is becoming increasingly clear that Boko Haram and Ansaru have distinct agendas and different tactics and target sets. There is a long history in using militancy to achieve political ends in Nigeria. Boko Haram -- or at least some of its factions -- satisfies political objectives in the north against President Goodluck Jonathan's administration, and two northern senators have been accused of helping the group. At least presently, Ansaru does not appear to have any of these connections. Its operations do not appear to directly influence Nigerian politics.

Boko Haram's use of suicide bombs, car bombs and other attacks means that it remains the more dangerous group overall. However, Ansaru's more transnational scope of attacks means that the group could pose a greater danger to Western targets and could have the ability to coordinate with other groups operating in West Africa.

Ansaru's Future

Documents recently found in Timbuktu, originating from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's leadership, describe how the group's contacts with local militants, such as Ansar Dine in Mali, are to be kept quiet. The same could be true for relations between al Qaeda's North African branch and Ansaru. Based on the history of those allegedly involved in Ansaru and the group's stated allegiances, it is very likely that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb will in some ways attempt to direct Ansaru's activities in Nigeria. Ansaru offers the al Qaeda branch further reach into northern Nigeria, which it has long sought.

If ties between the organizations do exist, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb may work more closely with Ansaru in an attempt to orchestrate its activities into a broader strategy. A Boko Haram offshoot with an aggressive stance toward foreign targets within Nigeria could attract like-minded Boko Haram leaders, such as Mamman Nur (the architect of the U.N. compound attack), and increase the complexity of the group's operations. Although Ansaru is not known to use Boko Haram's tactic of suicide bombings, shifting allegiances within Boko Haram-affiliated groups could bring elements into Ansaru that might expand on the current type of operations the group conducts.

Ansaru's development is significant, and while the group has not been responsible for a large number of attacks, its operations reach beyond Nigeria's borders. Ansaru could also extend al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's network farther south, possibly into Cameroon, and the group's rise could easily negate the gains made against militants in northern Mali. Regardless of eventual developments in the region, the risk of kidnappings near northern Nigeria is increasing.

The Rise of a New Nigerian Militant Group is republished with permission of Stratfor.

I thought Mrs. Bill Clinton was worthless at State

But John Kerry, who by the way served in Vietnam, may have just broken the record.
Kerry Gives First Foreign Policy Speech … on Climate Change

Secretary of State John Kerry gave his first major foreign policy speech today. In his address, delivered at the University of Virginia, he discussed tackling climate change.

"We as a nation must have the foresight and courage to make the investments necessary to safeguard the most sacred trust we keep for our children and grandchildren: an environment not ravaged by rising seas, deadly superstorms, devastating droughts, and the other hallmarks of a dramatically changing climate," said Kerry, according to prepared remarks.

"And let’s face it – we are all in this one together. No nation can stand alone. We share nothing so completely as our planet. When we work with others – large and small – to develop and deploy the clean technologies that will power a new world, we’re also helping create new markets and new opportunities for America’s second-to-none innovators and entrepreneurs to succeed in the next great revolution."

Kerry called for collective action to deal with this problem. "So let’s commit ourselves to doing the smart thing and the right thing and truly commit to tackling this challenge," he said. "Because if we don’t rise to meet it, rising temperatures and rising sea levels will surely lead to rising costs down the road. If we waste this opportunity, it may be the only thing our generations are remembered for. We need to find the courage to leave a far different legacy."

"We cannot talk about the unprecedented changes happening on our planet without talking about the unprecedented changes in its population – another great opportunity at our fingertips," he warned.

But midway through the climate change section, Kerry paused. "Can we all say thank you and to our signers?" the secretary of state said referencing those who were translating his speech into sign language....

OK, the Middle East is imploding, Israel is threatened by Muslin fundamentalists , China is on the march threatening Taiwan, Russia is surging, we have South American narcotics traffickers invading our country, we have shipped weapons to the gangs of a foreign nation, North Korean has the bomb and what does this idiot want to talk about? Global cooling....err global warming...oh yea, climate change.

I think of the great men and women who have led our State Department in history (Jefferson, Marshall, Rice) and I look at these past two and cringe.

God Help Us!

Another great stupid human story

Working on the streets for over a decade you see the 911 system get abused. You have probably heard about a woman calling once because a McDonald's was out of chicken nuggets. And I got a call from a woman because because her 16 year old would not do her homework. I had to explain to this rather shocked woman I was not here to raise her children.

With that in mind, here we go again.
Texas woman arrested after calling 911 for cigarettes, police say

GRANBURY, Texas – Authorities in North Texas say a 48-year-old woman called 911 to have a deputy deliver cigarettes to her home.

Hood County sheriff's Lt. Kathy Jividen says the woman, a Granbury resident, called 911 on Feb. 11 asking for the cigarettes. Jividen says the woman instead received a visit from two deputies and was arrested.

She was charged with a misdemeanor count of abuse of 911. She was later released from the Hood County jail on a $1,000 bond.

Jividen says the caller was "very intoxicated" when she dialed 911.

Granbury is about 65 miles southwest of Dallas.

Geopolitical Weekly: Hellfire, Morality and Strategy, February 19, 2013

By George Friedman
Founder and Chairman

Airstrikes by unmanned aerial vehicles have become a matter of serious dispute lately. The controversy focuses on the United States, which has the biggest fleet of these weapons and which employs them more frequently than any other country. On one side of this dispute are those who regard them simply as another weapon of war whose virtue is the precision with which they strike targets. On the other side are those who argue that in general, unmanned aerial vehicles are used to kill specific individuals, frequently civilians, thus denying the targeted individuals their basic right to some form of legal due process.

Let's begin with the weapons systems, the MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper. The media call them drones, but they are actually remotely piloted aircraft. Rather than being in the cockpit, the pilot is at a ground station, receiving flight data and visual images from the aircraft and sending command signals back to it via a satellite data link. Numerous advanced systems and technologies work together to make this possible, but it is important to remember that most of these technologies have been around in some form for decades, and the U.S. government first integrated them in the 1990s. The Predator carries two Hellfire missiles -- precision-guided munitions that, once locked onto the target by the pilot, guide themselves to the target with a high likelihood of striking it. The larger Reaper carries an even larger payload of ordnance -- up to 14 Hellfire missiles or four Hellfire missiles and two 500-pound bombs. Most airstrikes from these aircraft use Hellfire missiles, which cause less collateral damage.

Unlike a manned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles can remain in the air for an extended period of time -- an important capability for engaging targets that may only present a very narrow target window. This ability to loiter, and then strike quickly when a target presents itself, is what has made these weapons systems preferable to fixed wing aircraft and cruise missiles.

The Argument Against Airstrikes

What makes unmanned aerial vehicle strikes controversial is that they are used to deliberately target specific individuals -- in other words, people who are known or suspected, frequently by name, of being actively hostile to the United States or allied governments. This distinguishes unmanned aerial vehicles from most weapons that have been used since the age of explosives began. The modern battlefield -- and the ancient as well -- has been marked by anonymity. The enemy was not a distinct individual but an army, and the killing of soldiers in an enemy army did not carry with it any sense of personal culpability. In general, no individual soldier was selected for special attention, and his death was not an act of punishment. He was killed because of his membership in an army and not because of any specific action he might have carried out.

Another facet of the controversy is that it is often not clear whether the individuals targeted by these weapons are members of an enemy force. U.S. military or intelligence services reach that conclusion about a target based on intelligence that convinces them of the individual's membership in a hostile group.

There are those who object to all war and all killing; we are not addressing those issues here. We are addressing the arguments of those who object to this particular sort of killing. The reasoning is that when you are targeting a particular individual based on his relationships, you are introducing the idea of culpability, and that that culpability makes the decision-maker -- whoever he is -- both judge and executioner, without due process. Those who argue this line also believe that the use of these weapons is a process that is not only given to error but also fundamentally violates principles of human rights and gives the state the power of life and death without oversight. Again excluding absolute pacifists from this discussion, the objection is that the use of unmanned aerial vehicles is not so much an act of war as an act of judgment and, as such, violates international law that requires due process for a soldier being judged and executed. To put it simply, the critics regard what they call drone strikes as summary executions, not acts of war.

The Argument for Airstrikes

The counterargument is that the United States is engaged in a unique sort of war. Al Qaeda and the allied groups and sympathetic individuals that comprise the international jihadist movement are global, dispersed and sparse. They are not a hierarchical military organization. Where conventional forces have divisions and battalions, the global jihadist movement consists primarily of individuals who at times group together into distinct regional franchises, small groups and cells, and frequently even these groups are scattered. Their mission is to survive and to carry out acts of violence designed to demoralize the enemy and increase their political influence among the populations they wish to control.

The primary unit is the individual, and the individuals -- particularly the commanders -- isolate themselves and make themselves as difficult to find as possible. Given their political intentions and resources, sparse forces dispersed without regard to national boundaries use their isolation as the equivalent of technological stealth to make them survivable and able to carefully mount military operations against the enemy at unpredictable times and in unpredictable ways.

The argument for using strikes from unmanned aerial vehicles is that it is not an attack on an individual any more than an artillery barrage that kills a hundred is an attack on each individual. Rather, the jihadist movement presents a unique case in which the individual jihadist is the military unit.

In war, the goal is to render the enemy incapable of resisting through the use of force. In all wars and all militaries, imperfect intelligence, carelessness and sometimes malice have caused military action to strike at innocent people. In World War II, not only did bombing raids designed to attack legitimate military targets kill civilians not engaged in activities supporting the military, mission planners knew that in some cases innocents would be killed. This is true in every military conflict and is accepted as one of the consequences of war.

The argument in favor of using unmanned aerial vehicle strikes is, therefore, that the act of killing the individual is a military necessity dictated by the enemy's strategy and that it is carried out with the understanding that both intelligence and precision might fail, no matter how much care is taken. This means not only that civilians might be killed in a particular strike but also that the strike might hit the wrong target. The fact that a specific known individual is being targeted does not change the issue from a military matter to a judicial one.

It would seem to me that these strikes do not violate the rules of war and that they require no more legal overview than was given in thousands of bomber raids in World War II. And we should be cautious in invoking international law. The Hague Convention of 1907 states that:

The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
To carry arms openly; and
To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

The 1949 Geneva Convention states that:

Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:

(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

Ignoring the question of whether jihadist operations are in accordance with the rules and customs of war, their failure to carry a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance" is a violation of both the Hague and Geneva conventions. This means that considerations given to soldiers under the rules of war do not apply to those waging war without insignia.

Open insignia is fundamental to the rules of war. It was instituted after the Franco-Prussian war, when French snipers dressed as civilians fired on Germans. It was viewed that the snipers had endangered civilians because it was a soldier's right to defend himself and that since they were dressed as civilians, the French snipers -- not the Germans -- were responsible for the civilian deaths. It follows from this that, to the extent that jihadist militants provide no sign of who they are, they are responsible under international law when civilians are killed because of uncertainty as to who is a soldier and who is not. Thus the onus on ascertaining the nature of the target rests with the United States, but if there is error, the responsibility for that error rests with jihadists for not distinguishing themselves from civilians.

There is of course a greater complexity to this: attacking targets in countries that are not in a state of war with the United States and that have not consented to these attacks. For better or worse, the declaration of war has not been in fashion since World War II. But the jihadist movement has complicated this problem substantially. The jihadists' strategy is to be dispersed. Part of its strategy is to move from areas where it is under military pressure to places that are more secure. Thus the al Qaeda core group moved its headquarters from Afghanistan to Pakistan. But in truth, jihadists operate wherever military and political advantages take them, from the Maghreb to Mumbai and beyond.

In a method of war where the individual is the prime unit and where lack of identification is a primary defensive method, the conduct of intelligence operations wherever the enemy might be, regardless of borders, follows. So do operations to destroy enemy units -- individuals. If a country harbors such individuals knowingly, it is an enemy. If it is incapable of destroying the enemy units, it forfeits its right to claim sovereignty since part of sovereignty is a responsibility to prevent attacks on other countries.

If we simply follow the logic we laid out here, then the critics of unmanned aerial vehicle strikes have a weak case. It is not illegitimate to target individuals in a military force like the jihadist movement, and international law holds them responsible for collateral damage, not the United States. Moreover, respecting national sovereignty requires that a country's sovereignty be used to halt attacks against countries with which they are not at war. When a country cannot or will not take those steps, and people within their border pose a threat to the United States, the country has no basis for objecting to intelligence operations and airstrikes. The question, of course, is where this ends. Yemen or Mali might be one case, but the logic here does not preclude any country. Indeed, since al Qaeda tried in the past to operate in the United States itself, and its operatives might be in the United States, it logically follows that the United States could use unmanned aerial vehicles domestically as well. Citizenship is likewise no protection from attacks against a force hostile to the United States.

But within the United States, or countries like the United Kingdom, there are many other preferable means to neutralize jihadist threats. When the police or internal security forces can arrest jihadists plotting attacks, there quite simply is no need for airstrikes from unmanned aerial vehicles. They are tools to be used when a government cannot or will not take action to mitigate the threat.

The Strategic Drawback

There are two points I have been driving toward. The first is that the outrage at targeted killing is not, in my view, justified on moral or legal grounds. The second is that in using these techniques, the United States is on a slippery slope because of the basis on which it has chosen to wage war.

The United States has engaged an enemy that is dispersed across the globe. If the strategy is to go wherever the enemy is, then the war is limitless. It is also endless. The power of the jihadist movement is that it is diffuse. It does not need vast armies to be successful. Therefore, the destruction of some of its units will always result in their replacement. Quality might decline for a while but eventually will recover.

The enemy strategy is to draw the United States into an extended conflict that validates its narrative that the United States is permanently at war with Islam. It wants to force the United States to engage in as many countries as possible. From the U.S. point of view, unmanned aerial vehicles are the perfect weapon because they can attack the jihadist command structure without risk to ground forces. From the jihadist point of view as well, unmanned aerial vehicles are the perfect weapon because their efficiency allows the jihadists to lure the United States into other countries and, with sufficient manipulation, can increase the number of innocents who are killed.

In this sort of war, the problem of killing innocents is practical. It undermines the strategic effort. The argument that it is illegal is dubious, and to my mind, so is the argument that it is immoral. The argument that it is ineffective in achieving U.S. strategic goals of eliminating the threat of terrorist actions by jihadists is my point.

Unmanned aerial vehicles provide a highly efficient way to destroy key enemy targets with very little risk to personnel. But they also allow the enemy to draw the United States into additional theaters of operation because the means is so efficient and low cost. However, in the jihadists' estimate, the political cost to the United States is substantial. The broader the engagement, the greater the perception of U.S. hostility to Islam, the easier the recruitment until the jihadist forces reach a size that can't be dealt with by isolated airstrikes.

In warfare, enemies will try to get you to strike at what they least mind losing. The case against strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles is not that they are ineffective against specific targets but that the targets are not as vital as the United States thinks. The United States believes that the destruction of the leadership is the most efficient way to destroy the threat of the jihadist movement. In fact it only mitigates the threat while new leadership emerges. The strength of the jihadist movement is that it is global, sparse and dispersed. It does not provide a target whose destruction weakens the movement. However, the jihadist movement's weakness derives from its strength: It is limited in what it can do and where.

The problem of unmanned aerial vehicles is that they are so effective from the U.S. point of view that they have become the weapon of first resort. Thus, the United States is being drawn into operations in new areas with what appears to be little cost. In the long run, it is not clear that the cost is so little. A military strategy to defeat the jihadists is impossible. At its root, the real struggle against the jihadists is ideological, and that struggle simply cannot be won with Hellfire missiles. A strategy of mitigation using airstrikes is possible, but such a campaign must not become geographically limitless. Unmanned aerial vehicles lead to geographical limitlessness. That is their charm; that is their danger.

Hellfire, Morality and Strategy is republished with permission of Stratfor.

Sunday, February 17, 2013

Even the K9 is not taking this too seriously

Not quite as on target as the famous DWI report, "Sighted drunk, arrested same." but it's close...and funnier!
'I chase him, I bite him'... the crime report written by a DOG: Officer investigated after submitting witness statement in character as animal



Police are under investigation for jokingly filling in a witness statement in the name of a force dog.

Officers became exasperated when prosecutors asked for an account of a crime from a ‘PC Peach’, not realising Peach was the name of a police dog.

So they completed the form as if it had been written by the alsatian, and signed it with a paw print.

The dog’s statement read: ‘I chase him. I bite him. Bad man. He tasty. Good boy. Good boy Peach.’

The form was pinned up at a West Midlands Police station last week for the amusement of colleagues, who are often at odds with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) over the handling of cases.

Another officer took a photo of the statement and it found its way to a ‘cop humour’ page on Facebook on Friday.

The image was later deleted but the dog section of a different force, West Yorkshire, enjoyed it so much they posted the image on Twitter in a tweet that was shared more than 150 times.

The CPS, however, failed to see the funny side. Officials are believed to have complained to police that their mistake has been turned into a very public joke.

This is being considered by West Midlands Police’s Professional Standards Department and the officer who shared the picture, PC Mark Tissington, referred himself to the internal discipline unit. Sources say he is unlikely to be reprimanded.

DCI Julian Harper, from West Midlands Police, said: 'The Professional Standards Department is looking into this, early enquiries suggest it is a light-hearted exchange as a result of a misunderstanding around a police dog and a police officer. The matter will be investigated.'

It comes just a week after The Mail on Sunday revealed new guidelines for police on the safe use of the internet, which advise officers against sharing ‘operational material’ online.

Ian Edwards, chairman of the West Midlands branch of the Police Federation, said: ‘It’s a difficult time for police and sometimes humour is a way of venting frustrations. I would urge our PSD to be even-handed in the way they deal with it.’ ...


Can you imagine the letter Peach will have to write, "Dear Commissioner Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, I'm sorry but what was I supposed to do, so I did chase him and I did bite him..."

People at CPS, if you are offended at this you need to get a life. And another job. There are many other things you should get offended at and put your attention to.

Good work Peach!

Your friends, your enemies and what they mean

You have enemies? Good. That means you've stood up for something, sometime in your life.

Winston Churchill


One of the things I've always believed is a man is well judged by the friends he has. He is also well judged by his enemies. A great example.
Texas Senator Goes on Attack and Raises Bipartisan Hackles

WASHINGTON — As the Senate edged toward a divisive filibuster vote on Chuck Hagel’s nomination to be defense secretary, Senator Ted Cruz, Republican of Texas, sat silent and satisfied in the corner of the chamber — his voice lost to laryngitis — as he absorbed what he had wrought in his mere seven weeks of Senate service.

Mr. Hagel, a former senator from Mr. Cruz’s own party, was about to be the victim of the first filibuster of a nominee to lead the Pentagon. The blockade was due in no small part to the very junior senator’s relentless pursuit of speeches, financial records or any other documents with Mr. Hagel’s name on them going back at least five years. Some Republicans praised the work of the brash newcomer, but others joined Democrats in saying that Mr. Cruz had gone too far.

Without naming names, Senator Barbara Boxer, Democrat of California, offered a biting label for the Texan’s accusatory crusade: McCarthyism.

“It was really reminiscent of a different time and place, when you said, ‘I have here in my pocket a speech you made on such and such a date,’ and, of course, nothing was in the pocket,” she said, a reference to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy’s pursuit of Communists in the 1950s. “It was reminiscent of some bad times.”

In just two months, Mr. Cruz, 42, has made his presence felt in an institution where new arrivals are usually not heard from for months, if not years. Besides suggesting that Mr. Hagel might have received compensation from foreign enemies, he has tangled with the mayor of Chicago, challenged the Senate’s third-ranking Democrat on national television, voted against virtually everything before him — including the confirmation of John Kerry as secretary of state — and raised the hackles of colleagues from both parties.

He could not be more pleased. Washington’s new bad boy feels good.

“I made promises to the people of Texas that I would come to Washington to shake up the status quo,” he said in e-mailed answers to questions, in lieu of speaking. “That is what I intend to do, and it is what I have done in every way possible in the responsibilities that have been granted to me.”

In a body known for comity, Mr. Cruz is taking confrontational Tea Party sensibilities to new heights — or lows, depending on one’s perspective. Wowed conservatives hail him as a hero, but even some Republican colleagues are growing publicly frustrated with a man who has taken the zeal of the prosecutor and applied it to the decorous quarters of the Senate.

Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, said that some of the demands Mr. Cruz made of Mr. Hagel were “out of bounds, quite frankly.” Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, issued a public rebuke after Mr. Cruz suggested, with no evidence, that Mr. Hagel had accepted honorariums from North Korea.

“All I can say is that the appropriate way to treat Senator Hagel is to be as tough as you want to be, but don’t be disrespectful or malign his character,” Mr. McCain said in an interview.

Democrats were more blunt.

“He basically came out and made the accusation about money from North Korea or money from our enemies, and he just laid out there all of this accusatory verbiage without a shred of evidence,” said Senator Claire McCaskill, Democrat of Missouri. “In this country we had a terrible experience with innuendo and inference when Joe McCarthy hung out in the United States Senate, and I just think we have to be more careful...

...“Comity does not mean avoiding the truth,” he added. “And it would be wrong to avoid speaking the truth about someone’s record and past policy positions, even if doing so inevitably subjects me to personal criticism from Democrats and the media.”

To the growing core of ardent conservatives in the Senate, Mr. Cruz has offered a jolt of positive energy.

“If you don’t ruffle any feathers, you’re not doing anything right,” said Senator Rand Paul, Republican of Kentucky, who garnered similar attention in his opening weeks in the Senate two years ago.

Mr. Cruz was among the 22 senators who voted against reauthorizing the Violence Against Women Act, among the 34 who voted against raising the debt ceiling, among the 19 who tried to cut off military sales to Egypt, among the 36 who opposed a relief package for the regions hit by Hurricane Sandy, and among the three senators who voted against Mr. Kerry’s confirmation.

“I was compelled to vote no on Senator Kerry’s nomination because of his longstanding less-than-vigorous defense of U.S. national security issues,” said Mr. Cruz, who also questioned the commitment of Mr. Kerry and Mr. Hagel to the armed forces, though both served in Vietnam. Mr. Cruz has no record of military service...

...Last month, Mr. Cruz faced off aggressively with Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York on a Sunday talk show. When Mayor Rahm Emanuel of Chicago wrote to the chiefs of big banks urging them not to invest in gun manufacturers, Mr. Cruz followed up with letters criticizing the “bullying” of a political “Godfather.”...”

During the elections last fall a post on Legal Insurrection identified the then establishment Republican favorite to get the nomination for Senate, Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst as the current Senator from Texas. I was one of many who told the writer he was wrong and he quickly corrected his mistake. A point I make was thanking God he wasn't the Senator as all he wanted the seat for was to add to his resume and this was a retirement present. A thank you for all your good work in Texas with the party. And he would be there with McCain and Graham saying stupid stuff and going along to get along. He'd get all the glowing write ups in the Times and the Post.

Again Mr Cruz, you have good enemies. Hopefully we'll send John Cornyn off to retirement in 2014 so you can have another Tea Party member on your flank. Until then, keep up the good work.

Friday, February 15, 2013

Security Weekly: Soft Targets Back in Focus, February 14, 2014

By Scott Stewart
Vice President of Analysis

From time to time, I will sit down to write a series of analyses on a particular topic, such as the fundamentals of terrorism series last February. Other times, unrelated events in different parts of the world are tied together by analytical threads, naturally becoming a series. This is what has happened with the last three weekly security analyses -- a common analytical narrative has risen to connect them.

First, we discussed how the Jan. 16 attack against the Tigantourine natural gas facility near Ain Amenas, Algeria, would result in increased security at energy facilities in the region. Second, we discussed foreign interventions in Libya and Syria and how they have regional or even global consequences that can persist for years. Finally, last week we discussed how the robust, layered security at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara served to thwart a suicide bombing.

Together, these topics spotlight the heightened and persistent terrorist threat in North Africa as well as Turkey and the Levant. They also demonstrate that militants in those regions will be able to acquire weapons with ease. But perhaps the most important lesson from them is that as diplomatic missions are withdrawn or downsized and as security is increased at embassies and energy facilities, the threat is going to once again shift toward softer targets.

Soft Targets

Obviously, individuals desiring to launch a terrorist attack seek to strike the highest-profile, most symbolic target possible. If it is well known, the target can magnify the terror, especially when the operation grabs the attention of international media. Such extensive exposure not only allows people around the globe to be informed minute by minute about unfolding events, but it also permits them to become secondary, vicarious victims of the unfolding violence. The increased exposure also ensures that the audience affected by the operation becomes far larger than just those in the immediate vicinity of the attack. The attack on the U.S. diplomatic office in Benghazi and the killing of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens led to months of media coverage that has included televised congressional hearings and fierce partisan and bureaucratic squabbles in the media. It was the terrorist equivalent of winning the lottery.

However, in the wake of terrorist attacks, increased situational awareness and security measures make successful attacks difficult to replicate. Targets become more difficult to attack -- what we refer to as hard targets. When this happens, attackers are forced to either escalate the size and force used in their attack, identify a vulnerability they can exploit or risk failure.

In the August 1998 attacks against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, al Qaeda planners turned to the first option: a larger attack. They attempted to use large truck bombs to overcome the embassies' layered security. The embassies had decent perimeter security but lacked enough distance between the street and the buildings to protect them from a large blast. In both attacks, the attackers also tried unsuccessfully to get the bomb-laden trucks through perimeter security vehicle checkpoints to detonate them closer to the embassy buildings.

After those bombings, security enhancements made most diplomatic facilities more difficult to attack, leading militant groups to turn their attention to hotels. A strike on an international hotel in a major city can make almost the same kind of statement against the West as a strike on an embassy. Hotels are often full of Western business travelers, diplomats, intelligence officers and, not insignificantly, members of the media. This has made hotels target-rich environments for militants seeking to kill Westerners and gain international media attention without having to penetrate the extreme security of a hard target like a modern embassy.

But increased security is not the only factor that leads those wishing to conduct a terrorist attack to gravitate toward softer targets. For the better part of a decade, we have chronicled how the global jihadist movement has devolved from an organizational model based on centralized leadership and focused global goals to a more amorphous model based on regional franchises with local goals and strong grassroots support. For the most part, these regional franchises lack the training and funding of the al Qaeda core and are therefore less capable. This means franchise groups are often unable to attack hard targets and tend to focus on softer targets -- such as hotels or the U.S. ambassador while he is staying at a poorly protected office in Benghazi rather than at his residence in Tripoli.

Changing Threats in North Africa

As hotels in places like Amman and Jakarta became harder to attack with large vehicle bombs, attackers began to smuggle in smaller devices to bypass the increased security. There was also a trend in which attackers hit restaurants where Westerners congregated rather than the more secure hotels.

The same dynamic will likely apply today in the Sahel. We believe that the attack at the Tigantourine natural gas facility in Algeria was greatly aided by the complacency of the security forces. The attackers did not demonstrate any sort of advanced terrorist tactics or tradecraft. It would be very hard to replicate the attack on another energy facility in the region today due to increases in awareness and security. The increase in security will be compounded by the fact that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its jihadist brethren in the Sahel lack sophisticated terrorist capabilities and have lost their bases in northern Mali. This means they will be hard-pressed to conduct a successful attack against a hard target.

Furthermore, having lost substantial quantities of men and materiel, and with French and African forces potentially interdicting their lucrative smuggling routes, these jihadist groups will be looking to refill their coffers. Kidnapping is a longstanding way for militant groups in the region to resolve precisely these issues. Although they have lost control of the towns they captured in northern Mali, these groups will continue to pose a threat of kidnapping over a wide swath of North Africa.

Turkey and Lebanon

While the jihadist militants in Syria are currently fixated on attacking the Syrian regime, there is nonetheless a non-jihadist threat in Turkey -- and perhaps Lebanon -- that emanates from the Syrian intelligence and its proxy groups in the region. However, the Feb. 1 attack against the U.S. Embassy in Ankara demonstrated the limitations of the capabilities of one of those proxies, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front.

Carrying on the operational legacy of its parent organization, Devrimci Sol, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front aspires to conduct spectacular attacks, but its attacks frequently fizzle or fail. Successfully striking a hardened target such as the U.S. Embassy is beyond the group's capability. In fact, the group frequently botches attacks against softer targets, as in the attack against an American fast food chain outlet in May 2012 that failed when the explosive device malfunctioned.

The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front's limited tactical capability supports the theory that the attack against the U.S. Embassy in Ankara was commissioned by the Syrian regime. The group has even failed in suicide bombings against Turkish police stations with far less security; it knew it was attacking something beyond its reach. But at the same time, the group's limited capability and the failure of the attack against the U.S. Embassy will likely result in a shift to softer targets if the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front was acting at Syria's behest and the Syrians have asked for additional anti-American attacks.

As noted last week, Devrimci Sol conducted dozens of attacks against U.S. and NATO targets in Turkey during late 1990 and early 1991 at the behest of Saddam Hussein. The majority of these attacks were directed against soft targets such as U.S. corporate offices, nongovernmental organizations, hotels and restaurants. We believe these same targets are in jeopardy of attack by the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front now.

Syria maintains a number of proxy militants in Lebanon, including Hezbollah. Hezbollah has its own calculations and may not be as willing as Syria's smaller proxy groups to act on Syria's behalf. Hezbollah maintains a far more sophisticated militant capability than these small groups and is able to attack hard targets, unlike the smaller groups. Therefore, if the Syrians commission a terrorist attack in Lebanon and Hezbollah does not help them, the attacks their proxy groups will carry out will be quite limited -- and will again focus on soft targets.

For the most part, soft targets are soft by their very nature. It is not only impractical to employ embassy-like security at a fast food restaurant, but it is inordinately expensive -- too expensive to be economically feasible for a business. Still, there are some simple and practical security measures that can be taken to make them slightly more secure and hopefully cause anyone planning an attack to divert their operation toward an even softer target.

Additionally, individuals living in or traveling to these places can and should practice good situational awareness, review their personal contingency plans and mentally prepare to respond to any crisis.

Soft Targets Back in Focus is republished with permission of Stratfor.

Thursday, February 14, 2013

Officer Down



Detective Jeremiah MacKay
San Bernardino County California Sheriff's Department
End of Watch: Tuesday, February 12, 2013
Age: 35
Tour: 15 years
Badge # 1226

Detective Jeremiah MacKay was shot and killed as he and other deputies attempted to apprehend the suspect wanted for murdering Police Officer Michael Crain, of the Riverside Police Department, five days earlier.

After murdering Officer Crain, the subject fled to the Big Bear area of San Bernardino County where he remained at large for several days. On February 12th, the subject broke into a cabin and tied the occupants up before stealing their truck. The victims were able to free themselves and called 911 to report the incident.

A short time later game wardens with the California Department of Fish and Wildlife spotted the truck near the intersection of Glass Road and Highway 38. After a vehicle-to-vehicle shootout the subject fled into the woods and barricaded himself inside a cabin, which was immediately surrounded by law enforcement officers as the SWAT team responded to the area. Hundreds of rounds were exchanged during a prolonged shootout in which Detective MacKay and another deputy were both wounded. Both deputies were flown to Loma Linda University Hospital where Detective MacKay succumbed to his wounds.

The cabin that the subject fled into became engulfed. When the fire was extinguished a body believed to be that of the subject was recovered.

Detective Mackay had served with the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department for 15 years and was assigned to the Yucaipa Station. He is survived by his wife and child.
Rest in Peace Bro…We Got The Watch

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh. 

I love Coke but not this much!

When I was younger I used to drink 3-5 cans of Coke a day and I knew that was unhealthy. I changed to Diet Coke and by that alone I lost 10 lbs in a month. The fact it killed off 600-1000 calories a day probably helped. Now I'm down to 1 or 2 Coke Zero's a day, but water has made it for me (although I love the Chick-fil-A Diet Lemonaide)

So I gotta find this interesting. Drinking over two bottles of Coke a day may have led her demise. You think!
Report: Woman Drank Herself To Death With 2-Gallon-A-Day Coca-Cola Habit

ATLANTA (CBS Atlanta) – Medical examiners determined that a woman passed away due to complications caused by her extreme addiction to drinking Coca-Cola.

The woman, 30-year-old Natasha Harris of Invercargill in New Zealand, was said to have consumed an estimated 2.2 gallons of the soda per day, the Discovery Channel’s news website is reporting.

David Crerar, the coroner charged with investigating the 2010 death of the mother of eight, was quoted as saying that her habit “was a substantial factor that contributed to the development of the metabolic imbalances which gave rise to the arrhythmia”.

He added, “I find that when all the available evidence is considered, were it not for the consumption of very large quantities of Coke by Natasha Harris, it is unlikely that she would have died when she died and how she died.”

Before her death, Harris reportedly exhibited symptoms of withdrawal if she happened to run out of the beverage.

“[She would] go crazy if she ran out,” Vivien Hodgkinson, her mother-in-law, was quoted as saying by the Discovery Channel in an interview last year. “[S]he would get the shakes, withdrawal symptoms, be angry, on edge and snappy.”

Coca-Cola Oceania released a statement, which was obtained by the station, stating that experts – including Crerar, allegedly – did not feel that their product contributed to Harris’ arrhythmia conclusively.

“Therefore we are disappointed that the coroner has chosen to focus on the combination of Ms. Harris’ excessive consumption of Coca-Cola, together with other health and lifestyle factors, as the probable cause of her death,” the statement

All the same, Crerar said he feels that Harris’ death should serve as an impetus for the Atlanta-based company to include warning labels on all of their drinks.

“[I recommend] that Coca-Cola give consideration to the inclusion of advice as to quantity of caffeine on labels (in) its products and… adding appropriate warnings related to the dangers of consuming excessive quantities of the products,” he said, according to the Discovery Channel.

He also noted, however, that “Coca-Cola cannot be held responsible for the health of consumers who drink unhealthy quantities of the product.”

Thanks Doc for actually saying Coca-Cola is not responsible for someone drinking too much of their product. Who knows maybe we'll start thinking people are responsible for their own actions. Reading this article tells me this woman was not very responsible. Not many 30 year olds have 8 children. But I figures this out. A 2 liter bottle of Coke is 67.8 ounces, not quite 4 1/2 cans. Two 2 liters a little less than nine cans a day. Thats almost 1900 worthless calories a day in sugar water.

I love this comment at the bottom:
"All the same, Crerar said he feels that Harris’ death should serve as an impetus for the Atlanta-based company to include warning labels on all of their drinks."

Who needs a warning label to remind them not to drink 2 gallons of junk every day? Geez, people like this need a label on their feces to remind them not to eat it.

Brad
"Geez, people like this need a label on their feces to remind them not to eat it." .......Obama voters...............

Happy Valentine's Day!

Wednesday, February 13, 2013

Women are mad as hell and they will not take it anymore!

Does this need comment?
Cops: Woman, 50, Battered Boyfriend, 32, Because Six Came Before Nine

A Florida woman is jailed on a battery rap for allegedly striking her boyfriend after he “finished first and stopped pleasuring her” during a mutual oral sex session late last night in the victim’s home, police report.

Jennie Scott, 50, was booked into the Manatee County lockup on a misdemeanor charge stemming from the 11 PM encounter in the Palmetto bedroom of Jilberto Deleon, 32. Scott has dated Deleon “for the last 5 years on and off,” according to a sheriff’s report.

Deputies were summoned to Deleon’s home by a witness who heard the couple arguing and saw Scott (seen at right) atop Deleon “punching and scratching him.” She also allegedly struck Deleon with a stick and threatened to hit him with a wrench before the tool was taken from her hand by the witness.
Here is the report.

When questioned by a cop, Scott explained that she and Deleon “were giving each other oral pleasure in the bedroom” when Deleon “finished first and stopped pleasuring her.” Scott added that she “became upset and they began arguing.”
A deputy noted that Scott said that she was also mad at Deleon because she had “heard [him] having sex with another woman over the phone earlier in the day.” Scott struggled with deputies before being placed in a police cruiser, where she kicked a window until being warned that she would be maced unless she stopped.

Bail has yet to be set for Scott, who deputies described as “extremely intoxicated.”

If it seems something like this just happened, well, it did.

Or this:
Florida, Sex, CrimeWoman Jailed For Attacking Beau Over Bad Sex

Post-coital battery came after only boyfriend climaxed

NOVEMBER 27--A Florida woman was jailed last night for a post-coital assault on her boyfriend, an attack the victim says was prompted when only he climaxed during a sexual encounter in the couple’s residence.

Raquel Gonzalez, 24, was arrested Monday afternoon for felony domestic battery and booked into the Manatee County lockup, where bond has been set at $750. Gonzalez is pictured in the adjacent mug shot.

According to a Manatee County Sheriff’s Office report, Gonzalez and Esric Davis, 30, are “boyfriend and girlfriend who live in the same home and are involved in a sexual relationship.”

Deputies noted that Davis and Gonzalez were “involved in sexual intercourse” when “Esric then climaxed and Raquel did not.” Which reportedly angered Gonzalez, who allegedly “began hitting and scratching [Davis], causing scratches near his eye and nose.” Davis told investigators that Gonzalez “goes off” frequently and that she had previously been physical with him.

At one point, Gonzalez told deputies, “I have scratches on me too from where he tried to restrain me when I lost it.” Gonzalez was reportedly “belligerent and uncooperative” and declined to answer questions post-Miranda.

A sheriff’s report indicates that alcohol may have been a factor in the alleged battery.

So on this Valentines Day guys, make sure you please your woman!

I have to say I'm shocked!

Reader's Digest is still publishing.

Found this and it's interesting. What the bartender thinks as you're getting drunk.
13+ Things Your Bartender Won't Tell You

1. Yell, whistle, or wave money and I'm going to make you wait. Make eye contact and smile, and I'll come over as soon as I can. Know what you want and have your money ready. Don't create a traffic jam.

2. Start a tab. If I swipe your card five times this evening, that’s five times as much paperwork I have to do at 4 a.m.

3. You want a drink made 'strong?' Then order a double-for double the price.

4. Liquor sales in bars and restaurants were down 2.2 percent last year. Even beer sales are slow. But people scrimp on food first, drinks second.

5. A lot of bars have comp tabs, which allows me to give away drinks. It's smart business and helps build a base of regulars.

6. Bars that don't have regulars (in hotels, airports) have started using wireless gadgets that measure how much is poured and automatically ring up each shot. They're meant to prevent overpouring and to cut losses, but I don't like them-neither do customers.

7. If your tipping guideline is still 'a buck a drink,' listen closely: That doesn't fly if you order a $12 cocktail. Tip at least 15 percent.

8. At some bars, the sliced fruit garnishes sit out until they’re gone, sometimes for days. Munch accordingly.

9. The smoothest guys compliment a woman, then walk away-it's very nonthreatening.

10. I have the police on speed dial, and I never hesitate to call.

11. Don't order a round of drinks after last call. Last call applies to everyone-even you.

12. Some of us get a cut from the cab company when we call a taxi for a tipsy patron. Not that I've ever done that, of course.

13. Last week, a couple had a little too much and got into a dumb argument, then asked me to choose the 'winner' of the fight. There isn't a tip big enough to get me involved in that situation!

14.
If I cut you off, don’t argue.
 If anything, you should apologize if you’ve made a scene. 



15.
Get a room.
 The more you make out with your date, the closer you are to being cut off. 



16. 
I've heard it all. 
One guy told me I had the worst smile he‘d ever seen. I found out that he thinks a girl won‘t remember him unless he puts her down. I guess it worked; I‘m telling you this story three weeks later.



17.
Think tending bar isn’t a real career?
 You’re wrong. The craft of bartending is coming back, and some of us are even called “mixologists” now. 



18.
 I love sharing what I know.
 If it’s not busy, ask me about the history of drink or the latest cocktail I’ve invented. You’ll learn something new. 



19.
 I like a sophisticated palate.
You’ll win points with me if you request gin in your martini. 



20.
 My knees hurt.
 Bar mats prevent slipping, but I really like them for the cushioning. I use sole inserts in my shoes, too. 



21.
 I can tell if your date is going well or not.
 And I notice if you bring in a new date every week. 



22.
 Everyone should bartend a few nights in his life.
You learn so much about people. 



23.
 I'm not a piece of meat.
 If you’re going to hit on me all night, at least leave a big tip. 



24.
 It happens every time.
 The songs you line up on the jukebox will play right as you’re leaving. 



25.
 I do more than mix drinks.
 I love being your psychiatrist-matchmaker-entertainer-friend. Otherwise, I wouldn’t tend bar. 



26.
 Please, take a cab.




Please take @ 26 serious. Keeps me from working OT on DWI!

Office Down


Lieutenant Michael John "Chip" Chiapperini
Webster New York Police Department
End of Watch: Monday, December 24, 2012
Age: 43
Tour: 20 years
Incident Date: 12/24/2012

Lieutenant Michael Chiapperini was shot and killed while responding to a house fire at a home on Lake Road in Webster.

Lieutenant Chiapperini had responded to the fire as as a volunteer firefighter and was on the first piece of apparatus to arrive at the scene. As he and the other volunteer firefighters exited the pumper truck to start fighting the fire, a subject opened fire on them from an ambush position. Lieutenant Chiapperini immediately assessed the situation and began providing tactical direction to the other firefighters to take cover. He then maneuvered through the fire truck's cab and began moving on foot towards the shooter's location as the other responders took cover.

As he made his way towards the subject he was shot in the head and fatally wounded.

The subject held other responding officers at bay for several hours until finally committing suicide.

Volunteer Firefighter Tomasz Kaczowka was also shot and killed by the subject.

Lieutenant Chiapperini had served with the Webster Police Department for 20 years. He is survived by his wife and three children.
Rest in Peace Bro…We Got The Watch

Day is done, Gone the sun, From the lake, From the hills, From the sky. All is well, Safely rest, God is nigh.

Tuesday, February 12, 2013

Geopolitical Weekly: The Past, Present and Future of Russian Energy Strategy , February 14, 2013

By Lauren Goodrich and Marc Lanthemann

The future of Russia's ability to remain a global energy supplier and the strength the Russian energy sector gives the Kremlin are increasingly in question. After a decade of robust energy exports and revenues, Russia is cutting natural gas prices to Europe while revenue projections for its energy behemoth, Gazprom, are declining starting this year.

Russia holds the world's largest proven reserves of natural gas and continually alternates with Saudi Arabia as the top oil producer. The country supplies a third of Europe's oil and natural gas and is starting to export more to the energy-hungry East Asian markets. The energy sector is far more than a commercial asset for Moscow; it has been one of the pillars of Russia's stabilization and increasing strength for more than a century. The Kremlin has designated energy security as the primary issue for Russia's national security, especially since recent changes in global and domestic trends have cast doubts on the energy sector's continuing strength.

Throughout Russian history, the country's energy sector periodically has strengthened and weakened. Managing this cycle has been a centerpiece of Russia's domestic and foreign policy since czarist times. This historical burden now rests on Vladimir Putin's regime.

Russia's Imperatives and the Energy Factor

Russia is an inherently vulnerable country, surrounded by other great powers and possessing no easily defensible borders. In addition, Russia is a massive, mostly inhospitable territory populated by diverse ethnic groups that historically have been at odds with Moscow's centralized authority. This leaves Russia with a clear set of imperatives to hold together as a country and establish itself as a regional power. First, Russia must consolidate its society under one authority. Second, it must expand its power across its immediate neighborhood to create buffers against other powers. (The creation of the Soviet Union is the clearest example of this imperative in action.) Finally, it must leverage its natural resources to achieve a balance with the great powers beyond its periphery.

Russia has used a variety of tools throughout history to achieve these imperatives, ranging from agricultural exports to pure military conquest and intimidation. Starting in the late 1800s, Russia added energy to the list of vital commodities it could use to achieve its central strategic goals. By the 1950s, Russia's energy sector had become one of the major pillars of its economic and political strength.

The revenues from oil and natural gas exports show how the energy sector empowered the Kremlin to consolidate the country. Energy export revenues for the Russian Empire began flowing into government coffers in the late 1800s, with oil export revenues making up 7 percent of the export earnings. These revenues rose to 14 percent in the late 1920s during the early stages of the Soviet Union, and by the 1950s accounted for half of Soviet export earnings. Currently, energy revenues make up half of the government's budget. This capital influx was and continues to be instrumental in helping Russia build the military and industrial basis needed to maintain its status as a regional -- if not global -- power. However, as the Russian governments became dependent on energy, the revenues also became a large vulnerability.

Beyond export revenues, the energy sector has contributed to the creation of a domestically stable and industrialized state. Russia's domestic energy consumption is very high due to extremely cold weather for most of the year, but despite inefficiencies within the energy sector and the cost of producing energy, the country's domestic reserves have enabled Moscow to provide its citizens and the industries that employ them with low energy prices.

The energy sector also contributes to Russia's ability to expand its influence to its immediate neighbors. Moscow's use of energy as leverage in the buffer states differs from country to country and ranges from controlling regional energy production (as it previously did in the Azerbaijani and Kazakh oil fields) to subsidizing cheap energy supplies to the countries and controlling the energy transport infrastructure. Russia has used similar strategies to shape relationships beyond the former Soviet states. For instance, Russia is one of Europe's two main energy suppliers and is the only European supplier with large reserves of oil and natural gas and historically cheap prices. Russia's physical connectivity with Europe and ability to undercut any competitor have served as the basis of many of Moscow's relationships in Europe.

Evolution of Russian Energy Strategies

Energy's usefulness as a means of achieving Russia's three main imperatives has altered over time because Russia has had to change its strategies depending on shifts in domestic or international circumstances. Moscow's strength lies in its flexibility in managing its energy sector.

The importance of Russian energy was established in the late 1800s, when the monarchy saw great potential for the Russian Empire if it could develop this sector on a large scale. However, the empire had neither the technology nor the capital to start up an indigenous energy industry. As a solution, the monarchy eased its foreign investment restrictions, inviting European and U.S. firms to develop the Baku and Volga oil fields. This brought about a brief period of warmer relations between the Russian Empire and many Western partners, particularly the United Kingdom, France and the United States. All parties soon realized that the only way to make the Russian oil business profitable despite the high costs associated with the country's harsh and vast geography was to transform Russia into a massive producer. By the turn of the century, the Russian Empire was producing 31 percent of global oil exports.

As the importance of the Russian Empire's energy sector grew, it became clear that Russia's internal stability greatly affected the sector. The Bolsheviks used the energy sector in their attempts to overthrow the monarchy in the early 1900s. The oil-producing regions were one of the primary hubs in which the Bolsheviks operated because energy was one of the few sectors with organized workers. In addition, the Bolsheviks used the oil rail networks to distribute propaganda across the country and abroad. In 1904, when the Russian Empire cracked down on an uprising in St. Petersburg, mostly Bolshevik protesters set the Baku oil fields on fire. This cut Russia's oil exports by two-thirds, forcing Moscow and the foreign markets to realize oil exports' great vulnerability to Russian domestic stability.

Russia's modern energy strategies began forming after World War II. With the Soviet Union left standing as one of two global hegemons towering over a divided Europe, Moscow saw no barriers to achieving dominance in the global energy field. Between the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet oil output had doubled, making the Soviet Union once again the second-largest oil producer in the world and primary supplier to both Eastern and Western Europe. Revenues from oil exports started to make up nearly half of Soviet export income.

Because the Soviet Union was producing oil en masse and the Soviet system kept labor costs low, Russia was able to sell its oil at prices almost 50 percent lower than oil from the Middle East. The subsidization of oil to the Soviet bloc and then to Western European countries helped Moscow undercut Western regimes and strengthen its position in its own periphery -- a strategy that the CIA dubbed the Soviet Economic Offensive. For the Soviets, this was not about making money (although they were making money) as much as it was about shaping a sphere of influence and undermining the West. This strategy came at a cost, since Moscow was not bringing in as much revenue as it could and was producing oil inefficiently, rapidly depleting its fields.

In the 1970s, the price of oil skyrocketed due to a series of crises mostly in the Middle East. At the same time, Russia was already feeling the strain of sustaining the massive Soviet Union. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's regime was left with a choice: use the high global prices as a reason to raise prices in Eastern Europe and benefit the Soviet economy, or continue subsidizing the Eastern bloc in order to keep it beholden to Moscow and not push it to start thinking about other energy sources. It was a choice between two imperatives: Soviet national stability and holding the buffer zone. In the end, Moscow chose to protect its own interests and in 1975 raised the price of oil for its customers, allowing for further increases based on global market prices. By 1976, oil prices in the Eastern bloc had nearly doubled, remaining below global prices but rising high enough to force some countries in the bloc to take out loans.

The Soviet focus on maintaining high energy revenues continued through the mid-1980s, when these revenues accounted for nearly all of the Soviet Union's hard currency inflows. But the Soviets were dealt a double blow in the mid-1980s when the price of oil collapsed and the West imposed an embargo on Soviet oil, prompting Saudi Arabia to flood the oil markets. Moreover, the Soviet Union was falling far behind the West in technology, particularly in energy and agriculture. In response, starting in 1985, the Soviet Union moved closer to a market-based energy economy, raising prices for the Eastern bloc, requiring hard currencies for payment and allowing foreign firms to re-enter the energy sector.

But Russian strategy shifts were not deep and timely enough to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the decade following the fall of the Soviet bloc, the Russian energy industry was in disarray. The energy liberalization that started under Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s was taken to an extreme under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s. As a result, production fell by half and the Russian energy sector was divided between foreign groups and the emerging Russian oligarch class.

This changed under Vladimir Putin in 2000. One of the first items on Putin's agenda to help stabilize the country was to consolidate the energy sector under state control. This meant radically reversing the liberal policies from the two decades before. The government effectively nationalized the majority of the energy sector under three state behemoths: Gazprom, Rosneft and Transneft. The Kremlin became more aggressive in negotiating supply contracts with the former Soviet states and Europe, locking them into large volumes at extraordinarily high prices because these customers had no alternative energy supplies. The Kremlin also began cutting energy supplies to certain markets -- blaming troublesome transit states such as Ukraine -- in order to shape other political negotiations.

Though Moscow's energy strategy became fairly aggressive, it helped bring about a stronger and more stable Russia. Russian energy revenues soared due to high global oil prices and the high natural gas prices it charged in Europe. Russia had excess funds to pump into its political, social, economic and military sectors. Energy politics also helped Russia leverage its influence in its former backyard and forced Europe to step back from countering Russia's resurgence. Of course, the financial crises that swept Europe and Russia in 2008 reminded Russia of its need for its biggest energy clients when oil prices dropped and demand began declining.

Challenges to Maintaining Russian Energy

Russia's top concern is its vulnerability to fluctuations in the price of energy. With half of the Russian budget coming from energy revenues (of that, 80 percent is from oil and 20 percent comes from natural gas), the government could be crippled should energy prices fall. The Kremlin has already decreased its budget projections for oil prices to $93 per barrel instead of $119 -- though even at that price, the government is playing a game of chance. Stratfor is not in the business of forecasting oil prices, but historical patterns show that major international crises and fluctuations in global consumption and production patterns repeatedly have had sufficient impact on oil prices and on Moscow's revenues to destabilize the country.

Natural gas export revenues are also currently in question. With alternative natural gas supplies coming online for Russia's largest consumer, Europe, the Kremlin has been forced to lower its prices in recent months. This year, Gazprom expects to give European consumers $4.7 billion -- approximately 10 percent of Gazprom's net revenues -- in rebates due to price cuts.

In its current configuration, Russia's energy sector is under strain. The consolidation of the sector mostly under two large state firms had many benefits for the Kremlin, but after a decade of consolidation the disadvantages are piling up. With little competition for Russia's natural gas giant, Gazprom, the firm is lagging in technology and is considered unfriendly to outside investment. Russia's oil giant, Rosneft, recently began evolving into a larger monopoly like Gazprom, which could lead it to fall into a similar trap. With future energy projects in Russia requiring more advanced technology (due to their location and environment) and more capital, both Gazprom and Rosneft need modernization and foreign investment.

Corruption is also a major factor, with varying estimates of 20 to 40 percent of Gazprom's revenues lost to either corrupt or inefficient practices. Rosneft has similar problems. This loss would be sustainable with Moscow's previous high energy revenues, but it will not be sustainable in the future should energy prices fall or the maintenance and expansion of the energy sector become more expensive. The Kremlin is probing Gazprom, although with a culture of corruption rampant throughout Russian history there is little the Kremlin will be able to do to eliminate wrongdoing within the natural gas firm.

Moreover, Europe's dependence on Russian energy is decreasing. The natural gas shortages experienced throughout Europe during the Russian-Ukrainian crises of 2006 and 2009 were a stark reminder of how vulnerable European nations were because of their dependence on Russian natural gas exports. Both unilaterally and through the European Union, European countries began developing strategies that would allow them to mitigate not only Europe's vulnerability to disputes between Moscow and intermediary transit states, but also its general dependence on energy from Russia.

The accelerated development of new and updated liquefied natural gas import facilities is one such effort. This will give certain countries -- Lithuania and Poland, most notably -- the ability to import natural gas from suppliers around the globe and bypass Russia's traditional lever: physical connectivity. This is particularly significant in light of the accelerated development of several unconventional natural gas plays in the world, particularly the shale reserves in the United States. The development of a pipeline project that would bring non-Russian Caspian natural gas to the European market is another attempt -- albeit less successful so far -- to decrease European dependence on Russian natural gas.

Additionally, a set of EU-wide policies, including the Third Energy Package, has begun giving EU member nations the political and legal tools to mitigate Gazprom's dominance in their respective natural gas supply chains. This common framework also allows European nations to present a more unified front in challenging certain business practices they believe are monopolistic -- the latest example being the EU Commission probe into Gazprom's pricing strategy in Central Europe. This, coupled with the EU-funded efforts to physically interconnect the natural gas grids of EU members in Central Europe, has made it increasingly difficult for Russia to use natural gas pricing as a foreign policy tool. This is a major change in the way Moscow has dealt with the region for the past decade, when it rewarded closer ties with Russia with low gas prices (as with Belarus) and increased rates for those who defied it (the Baltics).

Finally, Russia faces the simple yet grave possibility that the escalating financial and political crisis in Europe will continue to reduce the Continent's energy consumption, or at least preclude any growth in consumption in the next decade.

Russia's Next Move

The Putin administration is well aware of the challenges facing the Russian energy sector. Russia's attempts in the past decade to shift away from dependence on energy exports by focusing on industrial development have not been particularly successful and keep the country tied to the fate of its energy sector. Russia's strategy of using its energy exports as both a foreign policy tool and a revenue generator is contradictory at times: To use energy in foreign policy, Moscow must be able to lower or raise prices and threaten to cut off supplies, which is anathema to the revenue-generating aspect.

Global and regional circumstances have changed to the point that Moscow has had to prioritize one of the two uses of its energy industry -- and it has unequivocally decided to maintain its revenue-generating capability. The Kremlin has begun crafting a set of policies designed to adjust the country to the changes that will come in the next two decades.

First, Russia is addressing the very damaging uncertainty surrounding its relationship with key transit states that traditionally allowed it to export energy to Europe. The construction of the Ust-Luga oil terminal on the Baltic Sea allows Russia to largely bypass the Belarus pipeline system and ship crude and oil products directly to its consumers. Similarly, the construction of the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea -- and eventually its southern counterpart, South Stream, through the Black Sea -- will allow Russian natural gas to bypass the Ukrainian and Belarusian transit systems if necessary. These two pipelines primarily will ensure natural gas deliveries to the major European consumer markets in Germany and Italy, with which Russia seeks to maintain long-term strategic partnerships.

By allowing Russia to guarantee deliveries to its major European customers, the bypass systems ensure Moscow's vital energy revenues. This strategy of future energy export flexibility will also progressively reduce the leverage Minsk and Kiev can exert in warding off Moscow's attempts at consolidating Belarus and Kiev as vassal buffer states -- one of the few foreign policy goals Moscow is still intent on pursuing through energy strategy.

Moreover, Moscow has adapted its energy strategy with European customers amid growing diversification and liberalization efforts. Gazprom has begun expanding the natural gas discounts formerly reserved for strategic partners such as Germany or Italy. The Kremlin knows that its only hope of maintaining natural gas revenues in the face of a potential global shale boom is to lock its customers into price-competitive, long-term contracts. Moscow will continue showing that it can offer European consumers guaranteed high volumes and low-cost deliveries that producers relying on liquefied natural gas shipping for transport can seldom afford.

Finally, Russia is focusing significant attention and funds on developing connections to the growing East Asian energy markets, diversifying its export portfolio should challenges in the European market continue intensifying. One aspect common to all the strategies Russia is set to pursue for the next decade is the high capital needed to complete them; the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline alone is set to cost nearly $15 billion. Despite the effects of the financial crisis in 2009, Russia still has vast capital reserves earmarked for these large-scale projects, but these funds are not infinite.

The Kremlin appears keenly aware of the challenges that Russia will face in the next two decades as another energy cycle draws to an end. Unlike Brezhnev and Gorbachev, Putin has proven capable of enacting effective policy and strategy changes in the Russian energy sphere. While Russia's dependence on high oil prices continues to worry Moscow, Putin has so far managed to respond proactively to the other external shifts in energy consumption and production patterns -- particularly those affecting the European natural gas market. However, the long-term sustainability of the model Russia is moving toward remains doubtful.
The Past, Present and Future of Russian Energy Strategy is republished with permission of Stratfor.